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Truly,	Madly,	Deeply.		
Hans	Maes	asks	what	it	is	to	love	a	work	of	art		Judging	works	of	art	is	one	thing.	Loving	a	work	of	art	is	something	else.	When	you	 visit	 a	 museum	 like	 the	 Louvre	 you	 make	 hundreds	 of	 judgments	 in	 the	space	of	just	a	couple	of	hours.	But	you	may	grow	to	love	only	a	handful	of	works	over	 the	 course	 of	 your	 entire	 life.	 For	 me,	 these	 include	 Jane	 Austen’s	
Persuasion,	 Nescio’s	 novella	 Titaantjes	 (somewhat	 imperfectly	 translated	 as	“Young	 Titans”),	 The	 Pixies’	 album	 Bossanova,	 and	 Richard	 Linklater’s	 film	trilogy	Before	Sunrise,	Before	Sunset,	Before	Midnight.	 	These	are	all	works	I	love	(or	have	loved)	truly,	madly,	and	deeply.		Let	me	say	something	about	the	‘madly’	part	first.	Most	of	us	know	what	it’s	 like	 to	 fall	 crazily	 in	 love	with	 someone.	 You	 feel	 the	proverbial	 butterflies	when	you	 catch	 a	 glimpse	of	 your	beloved	 in	 the	 street;	 you	 think	about	 them	constantly;	 you	 become	 interested	 in	 everything	 about	 them	 (where	 they	 live,	what	 they	do	 for	work,	where	 they	were	born,	 etc.)	 and	 the	most	banal	 items,	say,	 a	 napkin	 or	 a	 pen	 they	 used,	 suddenly	 acquire	 a	 special	 significance.	Something	very	similar	happens	when	you	 fall	 in	 love	with	a	work	of	art.	Each	time	 I	 see	 the	opening	sequence	of	Before	Sunrise,	 set	perfectly	 to	 the	music	of	Purcell’s	Dido	and	Aeneas,	 the	butterflies	are	 there.	And	I	catch	myself	 thinking	about	certain	conversations	in	the	film	for	days	and	weeks	afterwards.	I	confess	that	 I	 have	 visited	 Vienna	 and	 Paris	 just	 to	 retrace	 the	 footsteps	 of	 the	 main	characters	(and	film	crew),	just	as	I	have	visited	most	of	the	locations	described	in	Persuasion	as	well	as	the	house	in	which	Jane	Austen	is	said	to	have	written	it.	And,	yes,	if	I	could	get	hold	of	a	pen	once	used	by	Austen	I	would	be	as	thrilled	as	Sheldon	from	The	Big	Bang	Theory	receiving	a	napkin	signed	by	Spock/Leonard	Nimoy.		Naturally,	a	state	of	 infatuation	can	be	short-lived	and	superficial.	But	 it	need	not	be.	You	can	grow	to	love	a	person,	truly	and	deeply,	and	this	often	is	a	life-changing	experience	with	a	 lasting	 impact	on	how	you	 think	and	what	you	value.	The	 same	with	art:	 falling	 in	 love	with	a	painting	or	a	novel	may	be	 the	start	of	a	relation	that	lasts	for	decades	and	that	changes	the	very	fabric	of	your	mental	 and	 emotional	 life.	 It	 should	 be	 clear	 that	 this	 is	 very	 different	 from	merely	 judging	a	painting	or	novel	 to	be	successful.	You	can	 judge	a	novel	or	a	painting	to	be	great	and	yet	have	no	love	for	it	(Proust’s	In	Search	of	Lost	Time	is	my	own	go-to	example	here).	Equally,	you	can	fall	in	love	with	a	work	and	at	the	same	time	acknowledge	that	some	other	work	you	don’t	happen	to	love	is	more	successful	as	a	work	of	art.	For	instance,	I	have	no	difficulty	in	conceding	that	the	
Before	 films	 are	 not	 as	 accomplished	 as,	 say,	 Citizen	Kane	 or	Vertigo	 –	 films	 I	admire	but	do	not	love.		Curiously,	 in	 both	 the	 philosophy	 of	 art	 and	 the	 philosophy	 of	 love,	 the	phenomenon	 of	 loving	 an	 art	 work	 has	 been	 largely	 ignored.	 There	 are	 a	 few	exceptions	(the	topic	is	touched	upon	in	recent	essays	by	Jerrold	Levinson,	Sam	
Shpall,	 and	 in	 Alexander	 Nehamas’s	 Only	 a	 Promise	 of	 Happiness).	 But	 the	phenomenon	remains	severely	underexplored.	Before	we	investigate	why	that	is,	it’s	 important	to	draw	a	few	distinctions	–	because	the	word	 ‘love’	gets	thrown	around	a	 lot.	For	 instance,	 I	 love	Titaantjes,	but	I	also	 love	a	cold	beer	on	a	hot	summer’s	day.	There’s	a	difference	between	 these	 two,	obviously.	 In	 the	 latter,	what	 I	mean	 is	 simply	 that	 I	 like	 drinking	 chilled	beer	when	 it’s	hot	outside.	A	
Stella	would	be	good,	but	a	 Jupiler,	Vedett,	Duvel	or	Seefbier	would	do	 the	 trick	just	as	well.	When	I	profess	my	love	for	Titaantjes,	however,	I	refer	to	something	much	more	exclusive	and	much	more	profound,	 something	 that	goes	beyond	a	mere	liking.		Loving	a	particular	work	of	art	is	also	different	from	loving	art	in	general.	An	art	lover,	one	could	say,	is	someone	who	enjoys	engaging	with	art.	They	value	art	in	general	and	make	art	appreciation	an	integral	part	of	her	life.	There	may	be	a	few	works	that	the	art	lover	cherishes	especially,	but	then	again	there	may	not	be.	Similarly,	people	who	love	particular	works	of	art	will	often	be	art	lovers,	but	they	need	not	be.	Loving	a	work	of	art	should	furthermore	be	distinguished	from	loving	a	fictional	character.	Not	only	because	one	can	come	to	love	artworks	that	are	not	fictional	and	don’t	have	characters	(just	think	of	music),	but	also	because	one	can	 love	a	 fictional	character	–	assuming	that	 this	really	qualifies	as	 love	–		without	 loving	 the	work	 that	 brought	 the	 character	 into	 being.	 (The	 immense	popularity	of	Pride	and	Prejudice	in	the	1990s	was	in	large	part	due	to	the	mass-infatuation	with	Mr	Darcy	as	played	by	Colin	Firth	in	the	BBC	series,	rather	than	to	a	genuine	appreciation	of	the	book	as	a	work	of	 literature.)	Finally,	to	 love	a	particular	work	of	art	is	not	the	same	thing	as	loving	an	artist.	Of	course,	love	for	a	 painting	 or	 a	 film	might	 lead	 to	 a	 fascination	 for	 the	 artist	 who	 created	 the	work.	But	one	should	not	be	confused	with	the	other.	I	love	the	Before	trilogy,	but	I	don’t	love	Richard	Linklater.	So	why	has	the	phenomenon	that	we’re	interested	in	been	overlooked	in	the	relevant	 literature?	I	 think	this	 is	 in	 large	part	because	of	certain	prevalent	(pre)conceptions	 about	 love.	 For	 instance,	 if	 you	 believe	 that	 love	 must	 be	mutual	 in	 order	 to	 really	 qualify	 as	 love,	 then	 paintings	 or	 novels	 are	immediately	disqualified	as	love-objects.	A	painting	or	a	novel	will	not	love	you	back.	 Similarly,	 there	 can	 be	 no	 love	 for	 a	work	 of	 art,	 if	 you	 hold	 Kyla	 Ebels-Duggan’s	‘shared-ends	view’	according	to	which	love	directs	us	to	share	in	each	other’s	 ends.	 For	what	 would	 it	mean	 for	me	 to	 adopt	Bossanova’s	 ends?	 The	album	doesn’t	have	ends	or	goals	like	we	have.	Alternatively,	if	one	thinks	of	love	as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 particularly	 human	 capacity	 for	 valuation,	 as	 David	Velleman	does,	then	only	a	person	can	be	the	proper	object	of	love,	not	a	work	of	art	(or	any	other	object	for	that	matter).		Unsurprisingly,	 each	 of	 these	 conceptions	 has	 met	 with	 sustained	criticism	and	anyone	who	thinks	 there	can	be	unrequited	 love,	 that	people	can	love	their	country,	or	that	one	can	love	a	pet,	should	be	inclined	to	reject	them.				
The	fact	that	views	like	this	cannot	account	for	the	love	of	particular	art	works	I	consider	to	be	just	one	more	nail	in	their	coffin.		But	 if	 this	 isn’t	 the	right	way	to	think	about	 love,	what	 is?	While	 I	won’t	attempt	 to	 formulate	 a	 full-blown	 theory	 here,	 I	 do	 want	 to	 put	 forward	 the	following	 substantial	 claim:	 love	 always	 involves	 a	 complex	 of	 emotions	 and	dispositions	 held	 together	 by	 a	 deep	 concern	 for	 the	 beloved	 and	 an	 intrinsic	desire	 for	 interaction	 with	 the	 beloved.	 Not	 only	 does	 this	 conception	 of	 love	allow	 for	 unrequited	 love	 as	 well	 as	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 love-objects,	 such	 as	countries,	 animals,	 football	 teams,	 and	works	 of	 art	 (making	 it	more	 plausible	from	 a	 phenomenological	 point	 of	 view).	 It	 also	 acknowledges	 love’s	 forward-looking,	open-ended	character	and	helps	to	highlight	some	of	the	most	important	differences	between	loving	a	work	of	art	and	making	aesthetic	judgements	about	works	of	art.	To	begin	with,	 the	 judgement	that	a	painting	is	skillfully	executed	does	 not	 necessarily	 presume	 an	 emotional	 involvement	 with	 the	 object	 –	something	 that	 is	 characteristic	 of	 love.	 Secondly,	 such	 a	 judgement	 does	 not	necessarily	entail	any	deep	concern	for	the	work.	There	are	probably	tonnes	of	works	 that	 we	 have	 judged	 favourably	 in	 our	 lifetime	 and	 that	 we	 have	 now	forgotten	all	about.	 	Thirdly,	even	a	very	positive	aesthetic	 judgement	does	not	necessarily	 come	 with	 a	 desire	 to	 further	 interact	 with	 the	 object.	 You	 can	acknowledge	 that	 a	 vase	 is	 beautiful	 and	 yet	 have	 no	 inclination	 to	 buy	 it	 or	spend	any	more	time	 looking	at	 it.	 (Here	I	 take	 issue	with	Alexander	Nehamas,	one	of	the	few	contemporary	philosophers	who	has	tried	to	connect	love	and	art,	but	 who	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 make	 a	 distinction	 between	 judging	 a	 work	 of	 art	beautiful	 and	 loving	 it.	 For	 him,	 judging	 a	 vase	 or	 a	 painting	 to	 be	 beautiful	 is	identical	 with	 the	 spark	 of	 desire,	 the	 wish	 to	 engage	more	 with	 the	 object.	 I	believe	this	 is	much	more	typical	of	 love	and	that,	 in	 fact,	most	 judgements	are	not	forward	looking,	but	–	like	verdicts	–	backward	looking.)		Moreover,	 when	 we	 make	 an	 aesthetic	 judgement	 about	 a	 work	 of	 art	there	 is,	 at	 least	 according	 to	 many	 philosophers,	 a	 rational	 expectation	 that	others	will	(on	the	whole)	agree	with	us.	Famously,	 Immanuel	Kant	held	that	a	judgment	of	beauty	demands	agreement	–	a	claim	which	has	been	interpreted	by	some	 as	 an	 ideal	 prediction:	 someone	who	 judges	 an	 object	 to	 be	 beautiful	 is	claiming	that	under	ideal	circumstances	everyone	will	share	her	pleasure.	When	we	love	a	work	of	art,	by	contrast,	there	is	no	rational	expectation	that	others	will	share	our	love,	just	like	there	is	no	such	expectation	when	we	love	a	person.	Does	this	mean	that	love	is	a-rational?	Does	it	follow	that	our	love	for	a	work	of	art	is	not	based	on	any	reasons?	Well,	no.	As	a	rationalist	about	love	in	general	–	here	I	take	my	cue	from	Katrien	Schaubroeck’s	essay	‘Loving	the	Lovable’	–	I	also	think	that	the	love	for	a	work	of	art	will	typically	be	based	on	(and	hence	justified	by)	reasons.	After	 all,	when	given	 the	opportunity,	people	 can	 talk	endlessly	 about	the	works	they	love	and	will	often	try	to	make	their	deep	involvement	intelligible	by	 citing	 reasons.	 Conversely,	 if	 someone	 could	 not	 mention	 a	 single	 positive	reason	 for	why	she	 loves	a	 film,	but	 just	 shrugs	her	shoulders	when	asked,	we	
might	rightly	doubt	whether	she	truly	loves	it.	That	is	not	to	say,	of	course,	that	when	people	are	in	love	they	always	act	reasonably.	Love	gives	rise	to	all	sorts	of	unreasonable	behavior.	But	that	doesn’t	mean	that	the	love	itself	is	not	grounded	in	reasons.			But,	 the	 anti-rationalist	 might	 object,	 if	 you	 are	 justified	 in	 loving	 The	Pixies’	Bossanova,	 if	your	reasons	 for	 loving	the	album	really	are	good	reasons,	then	aren’t	these	reasons	also	going	to	hold	for	everyone	else?	So,	if	it	is	indeed	reasonable	 for	 you	 to	 love	Bossanova,	 then	 isn’t	 everyone	 rationally	 obliged	 to	love	 the	 album?	 This	 objection	 only	 makes	 sense	 if	 you	 assume	 that	 reasons	must	 be	 deontic	 (that	 is,	 demanding	 a	 particular	 action	 unless	 there	 is	 a	countervailing	 justification)	 and	 agent-neutral	 (what	 is	 a	 reason	 for	 X	 will	automatically	also	be	a	reason	for	Y).	But	why	assume	that?	Some	reasons	clearly	are	 non-deontic.	 These	 are	 reasons	 that	 invite	 rather	 than	 require,	 that	 justify	without	 ‘unjustifying’	 doing	 something	 else.	 Such	 reasons,	 as	 Jonathan	 Dancy	argues,	 are	 not	 ‘in	 the	 wrong-making	 business’.	 For	 example,	 Anne	 may	 have	good	reasons	to	get	angry	at	Elizabeth	but	if	her	good	nature	prevents	her	from	becoming	angry,	 then	surely	she’s	not	 in	 the	wrong.	Furthermore,	 there	can	be	
agent-relative	 reasons,	 when	 the	 reason-giving	 fact,	 or	 the	 formulation	 of	 the	reason-giving	 consideration,	 include	 a	 reference	 to	 the	 particular	 agent	 the	reason	 applies	 to.	 For	 example,	 Paul	 may	 love	 Phil	 because	 Phil	 helped	 him	through	 a	 difficult	 time	 and	 seems	 to	 understand	 him	 like	 no	 one	 else,	 and	because	 Phil’s	 voice	 and	 demeanor	 has	 a	 calming	 effect	 on	 Paul.	 These	 are	legitimate	reasons	 for	Paul	 to	 love	Phil,	but	 they	are	clearly	agent-relative.	The	fact	 that	Phil	has	 this	 effect	on	Paul	 is	not	 a	 reason	 for	 Jonathan	or	Michael	 to	love	Phil.		Reasons	 for	 loving	a	particular	work	of	art	are	very	often	agent-relative	and	almost	always	non-deontic.	When	 I	 read	Titaantjes	 for	 the	 first	 time	 I	was	about	the	same	age	as	the	main	characters	and	struggling	with	the	same	issues	as	they	 are.	 The	 novella	 really	 spoke	 to	 me	 and	 gave	 me	 the	 feeling	 of	 being	understood.	 It	 made	 me	 see,	 for	 instance,	 how	 the	 abandonment	 of	 youthful	ambitions	is	part	and	parcel	of	growing	up	and	it	did	this	in	a	way	that	filled	me	(and	 still	 fills	me)	with	 a	 benign	 and	 comforting	 sense	 of	melancholy.	 These,	 I	think,	are	good	reasons	for	me	to	love	Titaantjes,	but	obviously,	someone	else	is	not	required	to	love	the	novella	simply	because	it	makes	me	feel	this	way.	These	reasons	 are	 also	 non-deontic	 in	 that	 they	 help	 to	 justify	my	 love	 for	 the	 book	without	making	it	a	requirement.	If	I	come	across	another	story	that	fills	me	with	a	benign	and	comforting	melancholy	but	I	do	not	grow	to	love	it	in	the	same	way	as	I	 love	Titaantjes,	 that’s	absolutely	fine.	There	is	nothing	irrational	about	that	(just	 as	 there	 is	 nothing	 irrational	 about	 not	 getting	 angry	 even	 if	 you	 have	reason	to).		It’s	precisely	such	agent-relative	and	non-deontic	reasons	–	 ‘because	the	poem	helped	me	 through	 a	 difficult	 time’,	 ‘because	 I	 feel	 inspired	 every	 time	 I	hear	this	song’,	 ‘because	I	am	encouraged	and	reassured	when	I	see	this	film’	–	
that	 help	 to	 explain	 and	 make	 intelligible	 the	 deep	 concern,	 the	 emotional	attachment,	 the	desire	for	 interaction	–	 in	short:	 the	 love	that	we	feel	 for	those	works	of	art	that	come	to	occupy	a	special	place	in	one’s	life.						
